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Abstract
Our study considers the question of training in firms using an experimental
laboratory approach. We investigate the following questions : What conditions,
excluding external certification, will bring workers and employers to cooperate and
share a rent generated by the workers’ training? What conditions will induce work-
ers to accept the training oﬀer, for employers to initially oﬀer the training and to
reward the trained workers in the last stage of the game? We analyse the impact of
the size of the rent created by training and the existence of an information system
on employer reputation rewarding trained employees. Reputation does matter to
induce cooperation, but in the absence of external institutions, coordination on the
optimal outcome remains diﬃcult.
Keywords: general and speficic trainings in firms, accreditation, cooperation
and reputation, experimental econonmics.
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1. Introduction
Firms’ investment in training is considered essential to innovation and economic growth.
In the context of trade liberalization and market globalization, a well trained labor force
represents an important hedge over competitive international and national firms.
Becker’s seminal paper (1962) on training by firms in a competitive labor market, sug-
gested a clear distinction between general and specific training occurring outside the
education system. General training increases workers’ productivity, but it can be mo-
bilized in diﬀerent contexts and by diﬀerent firms. Firms anticipating that workers
could leave and that other firms can poach their trained workers have no incentive to
provide and finance general training. It is therefore left to employees to support the
costs of their general training. In contrast, specific training, is a training that is entirely
devoted to a particular production system and it can’t be easily redeployed outside it.
The firm as the sole beneficiary of this type of training will contribute to its funding.1
However, empirical studies by Lowenstein and Spletzer (1999), Garcia, Arkes and Trost
(2002), and Booth and Bryan (2007) showed that employers support the cost of general
training.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1999a, 2000), even in the context of a competitive labor market,
argued that firms financing of general training is possible if firms have a monopsony
power following the training of their workers.2 This monopsony power arises from the
asymmetric information obtained with the training on the workers’ level of ability, which
is not available to other employers in the labor market. General training is oﬀered by
employers when the expected earnings from the training of high ability workers are
large enough to compensate losses due to the training of low ability workers and with
the latter being invited to leave the firm.
Autor (2001) used a similar argument to show that training provided by temporary
help employers is general. He argued that free general skill training induces workers’
self selection and allows firms to screen workers’ ability. He found strong empirical
support for his model using surveys of the Bureau of Labor Statistics on temporary
help workers.
Booth and Zoega, (2000) considered that the complexity of the task justifies the funding
of general training by firms. Leuven, Oosterbeek Sloof and van Klaveren (2005) proposed
a model where a reciprocal worker may be willing to give the firm the full return on its
1Note that an important part of specific training is produced informally like ”learning by doing or
learning by observing”. This training is not valued by any types of certification and will not be discussed
in this paper.
2Acemoglu and Pischke (1999b) justified that general training is financed by firms operating in
imperfect labor markets. In those markets, the firms can benefit from their employees’ general training
in paying them below their marginal productivity by exploiting wage compressions of regulated labor
markets and from costs that restrict the workers’ mobility. Peraita (2001) found, however, little empirical
evidence in the highly regulated labor markets of Spain to support that model.
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general training investment. Using a representative survey of the Dutch population aged
16-64, they found that workers with high self reported sensitivity to reciprocity have
15 percent higher training rates than workers revealing a low sensitivity to reciprocity.
However, reciprocity can be either a direct or an indirect mechanism. Direct reciprocity
implies that: ‘I trust you because you were trustworthy with me before’ (Axelrod,
1984). Therefore, it relies on repeated interactions between the same pair of employer
and worker. In contrast, if the training oﬀer to a worker is not repeated by the employer,
either the worker accepts and the training is completed or the training is rejected. In
this last case, the employer loses money and he will not repeat his oﬀer to the same
worker. Thus, the training game relies more on indirect reciprocity: ‘I trust you because
you were trustworthy with others before’.
With respect to specific training, one important empirical question is whether such
training can be entirely specific? Training with computers and technical equipments
can be specific to a firm, but being competent in one software or with a single technical
unit is in more than one case suﬃcient to generate computer and technical skills that
can be used outside the firm. Thus, the training firm and the worker are likely to share
the costs of the training as well as the surplus or the rent associated with it. Kessler and
Lülfesmann (2006) have showed the existence of an incentive complementaryty between
employer-sponsored general and specific traning. Whether employees or workers should
invest in firm specific training is a question that has been studied with an experimental
protocol by Oosterbeek, Sloof and Sonneman (2007). They found that when the outside
wage is high and there are turnover costs, the employers invest more than the workers
do.
In this paper, we analyze the training of workers in firms using an experimental labora-
tory approach. The following question is studied: What conditions, excluding external
certification, will induce workers to make costly eﬀorts to complete the training oﬀered
by firms and for the employers to accept rewarding those eﬀorts by sharing the rent
generated by the training? In our model, the worker’s cooperation depends on the trust
towards his employer in the last stage of the game keeping or not his promise to share
the rent. To enforce cooperation, reputation building requires an institution that tracks
and disseminates information about players’ past actions. When lacking institutions
and in the context of players not interacting repeatedly, the eﬀectiveness of reputation
relies on indirect reciprocity by knowing about one another’s past actions.3
In a treatment without information on the previous decisions of the employer, the worker
has no means to learn about the employer’s reputation. We consider two treatments
with information, where the worker is informed whether the last promise by his current
employer was actually paid. These treatments reflect, in reality, the reputation of a
firm, which nourishes the worker’s trust or mistrust about the current employer sharing
3See Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (2005) for a similar attempt in online reputation mechanism.
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the rent generated by the training. In one information treatment, the participants know
that they play 25 periods as in the no information treatment. In the second information
treatment, the number of periods played is unknown to the participants but randomly
chosen. This feature introduces the dimension of risk associated with the duration of
firms, which is generally not known a priori.
All treatments involve two types of workers : a productive high ability worker and a
less productive low ability worker. The rent generated by the training is larger for high
ability workers.
In our model, training is a mix of general and specific training (see Booth and Byran,
2005, for an empircal support of this idea). It is general as the outside wage is aﬀected
by some trained workers leaving the firm. The training is partly specific since without
a certification program, it is diﬃcult for the trained worker to be recognized by the
market.
The experimental laboratory approach oﬀers an alternative to surveys in studying the
training of workers. Empirical studies on training oﬀers, even in surveys matching
’employers and employees data, pose tremendous diﬃculties in identifying the strategic
behavior of both firms and workers. Baron, Berger and Black (1999) using a matched
survey of employers and employees found that firms report 25% more training than
workers do.
The paper is organized in five sections. In section 2, we present our training model, its
resolution, a numerical application and the experimental design. Then, we present our
predictive theoretical benchmarks in section 3. Our experimental results are reported
and analyzed in section 4. In section 5, we conclude.
2. The theoretical game
Our basic economic model is based on Acemoglu and Pischke’s (2000) paper introducing
two modifications to their original model. First, we assume that the current employer
knows the ability type of the worker at the beginning of the game. This information
is discovered in at least two ways. Holding a diploma works as a signal of the worker’s
ability (Spence 1973). The employer may observe previous production spells from, for
example, periods of internship. The second modification allows the employer to propose
a pay bonus to the worker in order to enforce the worker’s decision to accept the training
oﬀered.
2.1. The model
The economy is composed of a large number of firms and workers. The productive
ability of the workers, noted h, is heterogenous and divided in two types, h = ηi with
3
η2 > η1 = 1. In the population there are respectively p1 workers of type 1 and p2 workers
of type 2.
The output, y, of a worker depends on his ability and his training:
y = αeτh,
If the worker oﬀer a training τ = 1; τ = 0 otherwise. If the worker has exerted the eﬀort
associated with the training e = 1; e = 0 otherwise. We assume a cost γ supported by
a firm oﬀering a training in period one. The worker accepting the training incurs an
eﬀort cost of c > 0. The production function is not firm specific.
The model consists of two periods. Workers produce nothing in the first period. The
production level in the second period depends on the previous decisions. If τ = 0, or
e = 0, the untrained workers produce ηi with i = 1, 2. With training, the worker’s
production is αηi depending on his type. Thus the return to training is α− 1 > 0. We
assume that the production of y induces a desutility cost f > 0 for the worker.
In the first stage of the game, the employer, knowing the worker’s type, decides whether
or not to oﬀer training to the worker. If the employer decides not to oﬀer training,
(τ = 0), the game is over. With τ = 1 the employer endures a cost γ, and we move to
the second stage of the game. In the second stage, the worker must decide to accept
or refuse the training oﬀer. The training oﬀer consists in a bonus P promised to the
worker. If the worker refuses (e = 0), the game is over. If the worker accepts the training
(e = 1) , he endures an eﬀort cost c. In the last stage of the game, the employer decides
to transfer or not to transfer to the trained worker the bonus P.
The payoﬀs of the employers/workers are reported in the game tree presented below.
Training, 1τ =
No training, 0τ =
Employer
Promise P Worker
Employer
Rejects, 0e =
Accepts, 1e =
Pays, P
Doesn' t pay, 0P =
( )1 W
w
y v W
v W f
λ γ− − − −
+ −
( )1 W
w
y v W
v W f
λ− − −
+ −
( )1 W
w
y v W
v W f c
λ γ− − − −
+ − −
( )1 W
w
y v W
v W f
P
c P
λ γ− − − − −
+ − − +
Figure 1: The training game tree
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In figure 1, y corresponds to the output of untrained workers and y is the output of
trained workers. λ is the fraction of workers who leave the firm, corresponding to an
exogenous turnover rate. The (outside) wage on the labor market assuming that no
worker accepts the training oﬀer (or exerts the eﬀort associated with the training) is:
v =
p1 + p2λη2
p1 + p2λ
> 1
This wage is higher than the production of the workers with low ability since a fraction
of high ability workers leave the firm. The firm is forced to pay the same wage to
the remaining workers, thus its layoﬀ policy is to oﬀer a wage v = 1 to low ability
workers, a decision that will motivate them to leave the firm. The outside labor market
is competitive so firms have to pay a first period training wage to ensure zero profit. In
t = 1, the firms due to their monopsony power make expected profits of :
Πe = (1− λ) [p2(η2 − v)]
Firms will pay up front wages such that Πe − (Ww +We) = 0. Ww is the wage oﬀered
to workers for their participation at period t = 0, and the employers receive We. The
expected profit is shared between employers and workers according to a specific rule.
The payoﬀs of both players at all stages of the game follow from the discussion. For
example, the net payoﬀ of the worker who receives no training corresponds to his wage
rate v plus his share Ww of the profit minus his desutility cost f.
2.2. Numerical application and the experimental design
To distinguish between the low and high ability workers, we assume in the experimen-
tal protocol that the ability of the workers’ population, noted η, follows a log-normal
distribution. With the mean of log η set to 0 and its standard deviation equal to 0.5, we
obtain a mean to median ratio of abilities equal to 1.1331 (a value corresponding to a
mean to median ratio of incomes observed in many countries). From this distribution,
we define four types of workers (see in Appendix, Table A1 for the relative distribu-
tion of worker’s ability level). For simplicity, we disregard the 20% lowest and the 20%
highest levels of ability. Our reasoning is that the firms will neglect the rent produced
by the training of workers of the lowest level of ability as the expected net return on
training is too low. For the highest ability workers, either the marginal return on their
training is considered too low or the firms will always oﬀer them a training (τ = 1).
Outputs of workers depend on their ability level and the players’ decisions (see Appen-
dix, table A2). We assume a turnover labor market rate of 5% (λ = 0.05). All workers
support a desutility cost f = 50. The total cost of training (γ + c = 15) is shared with
γ = 5 charged to the employer and c = 10 to the worker. The equilibrium labor market
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wage, v, obtained with this specification is 60.4 The expected profit (Πe = 54) is shared
between the employer (We = 40.5) and the worker (Ww = 13.5).5 These values reported
in table 1 yield the numerical payoﬀs of workers and employees corresponding to Figure
1 for all treatments.
Table 1: Payoﬀs of employers and workers
employer high and low
Decision nodes low ability high ability ability workers
τ = e = 1;P > 0 35.5− P 101− P 13.5 + P
τ = e = 1;P = 0 35.5 101 13.5
τ = 1; e = 0 −2.5 41.2 23.5
τ = 0 2.5 46.2 23.5
We adopt a 3×2 design of treatments with the following strategic variables: information
available to the worker (Information vs. No Information), the ability level of the worker
(Ability vs. No Ability) and the number of periods (F ixed vs. Random). We use the
symbol IE for information treatments where the number of periods of play is chosen
randomly. More specifically, for theses treatments, the participants were informed that
the number of periods to be played is randomly determined by the computer over the
interval [5, 45] with each number in the interval having the same chance to occur. At
the end of period 5 and for all the subsequent periods, the participants will be informed
whether the session continues or is over (see instructions in Appendices). To minimize
the number of sessions to run and to be able to compare the results from the two
information treatments, we have selected the expected number of 25 periods to be
played by all participants.
Treatments Information / Nb. of periods
Ability level of worker No / Fixed Yes / Fixed Yes / Random
low : η = 80 NANI NAI NAIE
high : η = 126 ANI AI AIE
In each treatment, the participants play 25 periods in a stranger protocol pairing.
3. Game theoretical solutions and predictions and the experimental
procedure
3.1. Solutions and predictions
We use backward induction to derive the equilibrium behavior of the employer and the
worker’s optimal training decisions in our diﬀerent treatments. Consequently, we start
the analysis of the game at the last stage and present the employer’s reward policy of
4v = p0η0+(p1η1+p2η2+p3η3)λ
p0+(p1+p2+p3)λ = 60.208 ' 60.
5Πe = (1 − λ)[p1(η1 − v) + p2(η2 − v) + p3(η3 − v)] = 54.15 ' 54 which is divided between the
employer (We = 40.5) and the worker (Ww = 13.5) such that Πe − (Ww +We) = 0.
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a trained worker. Then, we look at the worker’s optimal training decision. Finally, we
determine the optimal choice of training oﬀer by the employer in stage 1.
In the No Information treatments, the employer cannot commit irrevocably to pay P
(the amount promised) to the worker in the last stage of the game. Therefore, the
promise works as a cheap talk and the worker who accepts the training oﬀer will not
received P . Knowing that he will never be rewarded for the costly choice of training
acceptance, the worker will never accept any oﬀers. Consequently, no employer will make
the costly choice of oﬀering a training. This result is independent from the ability level
of the worker: the unique Nash equilibrium predicts no training oﬀers by employers
and no training acceptance by workers. The theoretical results hold for all periods
as interaction is anonymous and one-shot, therefore the 25 periods are repetitions of
static games and not a dynamic game giving rise to further equilibria. In other words,
the stranger protocol pairing implies a random-matching that allows us to eliminate
reputation eﬀects. Thus, we should observe no trained workers in treatments ANI and
NANI.
Let us now consider the information treatments with a finite and an infinite horizon
game. Given the worker is informed about the status of the last promise by his current
employer, he knows, before making a decision, whether the last worker who accepted
an oﬀer received P . Since the number of rounds is fixed and known by the players for
information treatments I, players face a finitely repeated game. With the number of
periods fixed, cooperation cannot be sustained and the backward induction principle
implies that the employer will not reward the trained worker in the last stage of the
last round. The worker will reject the training oﬀer in round 25, and the employer will
not oﬀer a training in that last round. Game theory predicts that the non cooperating
equilibrium strategy played in finitely repeated interactions is the same as in the one
shot game (Selten, 1978).6
In the random number of periods treatments, IE, the employers are in an infinitely re-
peated game, which ends after a random number of repetitions, and therefore reputation
building may enforce cooperation among players. However, models based on sub-game
perfection imply that enforcing cooperation requires information about reputation that
is recursive in nature; one needs to know not only one’s partner’s past action but also
one’s partner’s partners’ past actions, and so on.
6Although a fixed number of rounds should lead to a unique perfect sub-game equilibrium, some
participants may not explicitly take into account the last period of play in their strategic considerations
as mentionned in Osborne and Rubinstein (1994, see paragraph 8.2 in chapter 8). Thus, cooperation
may raise from Information treatments but it should decline over time (i.e. when the end is imminent).
However, in a famous paper, Kreps et al. (1982) demonstrate that if each player assesses a positive
probability that his partner is ’cooperative’ if the other cooperates, then sequential equilibria exist
wherein perfectly rational player cooperating in finitely repeated game until the last few stages. Note
that in our design, this explanation can’t hold because of the limited information disseminated among
players.
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As motivated in Bolton, Katok and Ockenfels (2004, 2005), available information is
unlikely to be this extensive, implying a rather limited domain on which informal rep-
utation systems can be eﬀective. In practice, only partial information about others’
reputation is typically available. Models relaxing the sub-game perfection principle sug-
gest that cooperation can be sustained on quite modest amounts of information; perhaps
solely on information about a partner’s recent past, information that is relatively easy
to observe. With reputation eﬀects, the structure of the game is modified. Assuming
that employers take into account the eﬀect of their current behaviors on the other work-
ers’ future behavior, the payment of P in the first round may generate cooperation (i.e.
training acceptation by workers and rent sharing by employers). If the employer can
commit to pay a compensation refunding the cost of training plus epsilon to the worker
(i.e.P = 10 + ε), he should accept such oﬀers. As the employer will meet a succession
of workers, the payment of the promise in the first round corresponds to a costly signal
sent to workers in the next rounds. In case of payment, the employer signals to their
future workers that he will reward trained workers or at least that he did so. Thus, the
employers who paid P signal their willingness to cooperate with workers who accept
their oﬀers. In consequence, the next workers will be more likely to accept his promise
and received P . As a result, some employers may develop a good reputation. Whereas
defection of the employer implies no cost in the current round (P = 0), the employer
sends a negative signal to all the future workers in doing so. Thus, a worker who ob-
serves that his current employers didn’t paid P to the last trained worker shouldn’t
accept his oﬀer.
To sum up, the absence of external institution to enforce promised payments makes
cooperation impossible between players in the No Information treatments, disregarding
their ability level. In the Information treatments with a finite horizon game, neither the
information condition, nor the ability level (i.e. the size of the rent) should influence the
players’ behaviors. Therefore, we should observe no training oﬀer -no acceptance and no
honored oﬀer- for the high and low ability treatments for both the No Information and
the Information treatments with a fixed number of rounds. The situation diﬀers with
the information treatment with an infinite horizon game, IE.With a random number of
periods, reputation building should enforce cooperation among players. More training
should be oﬀered and accepted, particularly for the Ability treatment where the payoﬀs
are more important. Training oﬀers honored by employers should be observed in the
IE treatments, particularly in the Ability treatment.
3.2. The experimental procedure
The computerized experiment involved 12 sessions of 18 participants playing 25 indepen-
dent periods for a total of 5600 observations, or 900 observations per treatment. After
each round, participants were randomly rematched by pairs within their initial group of
6 without switching roles. A participant is usually confronted with 6 diﬀerent partners
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in an irregular fashion. We did not inform the participants about the restrictive match-
ing procedure that allowed us to get 6 independent observations for each treatment for
the non parametric analysis of the data. Participants, mostly students of economics or
business administration from the University of Montreal, were invited by leaflets and
e-mails to register for the experiment. They were seated at visually isolated terminals
where they found the written instructions (see in Appendix for an English translation
of the instructions for one treatment).7 The instructions were read by the instructor
and the participants were invited to privately ask for clarifications. All participants had
to complete a comprehension questionnaire. The experiment started when all questions
were correctly answered by all participants.
Basic information feedback was the same in all treatments. The worker was first told
if the employer made him an oﬀer of not. If the worker accepted the oﬀer, he was
informed in the last stage of the game if the employer had respected his promise P or
not. Profit for the period and cumulated earnings were given to the participants. In
treatments with Information, the worker got additional information about the value of
the last paid promise by his current employer.
The computerized experiment was programmed and conducted with the sofware Z-tree
(Fischacher 2007). In all sessions we used the same conversion rate for ECU (Exper-
imental Currency Unit) : 1 ECU = 2 Canadian cents. Including the show-up fee,
participants have earned an average of 22 Canadian dollars. A session lasted about 90
minutes including reading the instructions and running thecomprehension questionnaire.
4. Results
Average earnings of employers and workers by treatments are reported in table 2. For
the Information treatment with known 25 periods of play and the No Information
treatment, the employers’ payoﬀs are higher on average than the theoretical predictions.8
The earnings are higher for the high ability workers, A, while more in line with the theory
for the low ability workers, NA.
7 In the experiment, the employer was named player A and the worker player B.
8As mentionned earlier, for convenience, the ability level is noted A (NA) for high (low) ability
workers. NI is for no information treatments. The information treatments with 25 fixed periods
corresponds to I. For the information treatments with expected 25 periods we add a suﬃx E for
expected. Therefore, the AIE treatment stands for Ability and Information treatment with Expected
25 periods.
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Table 2: Average earnings per round in ECU
Treat- Employers’ earnings Workers’ earnings
ment actual predicted actual predicted
AI 66.91 46.2 31.61 23.5
AIE 63.48 > 46.2 30.58 > 23.5
ANI 59.35 46.2 25.11 23.5
NAI 6.92 2.5 23.77 23.5
NAIE 6.60 > 2.5 23.47 > 23.5
NANI 6.37 2.5 22.09 23.5
The results for the information treatment with a random number of periods, IE, is in
line with the theory.
Thus, in general, participants and, in particular, those associated with the high ability
workers are more cooperative than the theory predicts as they succeed to create the
rent associated with training. To investigate their behavior, we analyze the dynamic
of the game: the employers’ training oﬀer, the workers’ decisions to accept or not the
oﬀer, and the employers’ decisions in the last phase of the game to reward or not the
trained workers.
4.1. Aggregate results and the dynamic of the game
In contradiction with the theoretical predictions, in the NI and I treatments, the em-
ployers oﬀer a significant amount of training.in the first period 9 This result is maintained
for experienced participants up to period 20, except for the ANI treatment,where the
number of oﬀers is insignificant after round 20. We also note an end-game eﬀect char-
acterized by the rejection of a significant number of oﬀers in the last period (round 25).
In more than 83% of all cases, the employers oﬀer training. The light columns of
figure 2 indicates that the number of training oﬀers diﬀers between treatments, but
the diﬀerence between AI and NAIE is the only significant one (U robust rank order
test).10 Figure 2 also indicates that an important number of workers are trained with
percentages ranging from 73% in the AI treatment to 28% in the NANI treatment. The
AI treatment is statistically superior to NAI, NAIE, and NANI, and AIE dominates
NAIE, and NANI confirming the empirical literature that high ability workers receive
more training than low ability workers.
9Based on Binomial tests.
10The tests were done with Stata, under the name of Fligner-Policello Robust Rank Order Test.Two-
tails tests unless specified.
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Figure 2 : Frequencies of trained workers and training oﬀers.
The large proportions of oﬀers for the low ability workers in the inform treatment with a
random number of periods, NAIE, and in the low ability no informormation treatment,
NANI relative to the low ability inform treatment with a fixed number of periods, NAI,
although statistically insignificant, suggests that employers try to exploit the employees
poor control of the situation. Interestingly, however, the employees appear to be aware
of this and massively reject the training oﬀer.
In table 3, we report random eﬀect probit models on the role of treatments to explain
the probability that a training (promise) is oﬀered by the employer and the probability
that the worker accepts the training. The results basically confirm the non parametric
tests. Relative to the no information no ability treatment, the information treatment
with fixed period and with high ability workers increases both probabilities. With the
information treatment with 25 periods expected, the results diﬀer according to the
ability: employers are more likely to oﬀer more training to low ability workers, while
high ability workers are more likely to accept the training oﬀers. Low ability workers
refuse to be fooled while high ability workers believe that they have a better chance to
get to their share of the rent with employers honoring their promises.
Table 3: Treatments and the probability of training oﬀers (promises) by employers and the
probability of workers accepting the training
(Random eﬀects probit models)
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Variables and
incidental param.
promises acceptation
with balanced data with unbalanced data
Non Inform x No Ability Ref. Ref.
Inform x Ability 0.8049a 1.3713a
(0.2800) (0.2846)
Inform x No Ability 0.2045 0.1880
(0.2840) (0.2619)
Non Inform x Ability 0.2697 0.4431c
(0.2846) (0.2616)
Inform (Expected 25 periods) x Ability 0.3123 1.1001a
(0.3262) (0.2943)
Inform (Expected 25 periods) x No Ability 0.5350b 0.2132
(0.2726) (0.2874)
Constant 1.3848a -0.6616a
(0.1889) (0.2147)
ρ 0.6226a 0.3114a
(0.0436) (0.0410)
Log Likelihood: Constraint value -1167.01 -1579.48
Log Likelihood: Binary Probit value -1135.69 -1454.48
Log Likelihood: Random eﬀects probit value -854.90 -1323.02
Number of observations 2700 2280
Note: Statistically significant at 1%; b: Statistically significant at 5%; c: Statistically significant
at 10%. Two tail tests.
4.2. Employers’ training oﬀers
In Table 4, the determinants of training oﬀers by treatments are investigated with
random eﬀects probit models. The endogenous, exogenous and predetermined variables
used in the regressions are specified in the Appendix (see Table A3).
Let the latent variable T ∗it represents the utility for the employer i to oﬀer at period t
a training to a worker. This decision is explained by a vector of observable variables
zit, the corresponding parameter vector δ, a random individual component ηi, and a
random variable εit :
T ∗it = zitδ + ηi + εit, i = 1, ...., n, t = 1, .....T.
The two random elements are independent and follow a normal distribution. The latent
variable T ∗it is unobservable, but we do observe the i individual employer in period t
oﬀering or not a training to the worker. Thus, we use the auxiliary variable Pit,
Pit =
⎧
⎪⎨
⎪⎩
1, if T ∗it > 0,
0, otherwise.
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Two specifications are considered. In column (1), only the variables associated with the
experimental design are used. We have a ’1stperiod’ dummy variable to signal willingness
to cooperate between employers and the workers before the participants enter in the
dynamic of the game. The dummy ’Last five periods’ captures an end game-eﬀect, if it
exists. The variable ’Period’ tracks the dynamics of the game and the learning process
of the participants. ’High ability’ is a dummy variable, with the reference variable being
the ’Low ability worker’. For both the employer and the worker, there is a risk that
the other will not cooperate. For the employer, it is costly to have an oﬀer rejected,
particulary, in the low ability treatment. The dummy variables ’Last oﬀer by employers
was rejected’ and the crossed variable ’Last oﬀer rejected*High ability’ could explain
the next period behavior of the employer in oﬀering a training.
The results from column (1) relate to incentive variables. In column (2), we add the
participants’ characteristics as controlled variables: gender and dummies for graduate
students and students in economics or in related fields (business, mathematics, computer
science), which might perform better in experiments involving aspects of game theory.
The variable ’Previous participant’ informs if the subject has participated in a labora-
tory experiment in the past. Finally, a dummy variable distinguishes the risk-seeking
participants.11
For simplicity, we only comment the statistically significant parameter estimates of col-
umn (2). The probability to oﬀer training decreases significantly over time, converging
toward the theory. However, in contradiction with the theory, we note the strong statis-
tically negative coeﬃcient with the first period dummy variable in the inform treatment
with expected 25 periods. The worker’s level of ability makes no diﬀerence when the
participant has no information, in line with the theory, but the probability of an oﬀer
increases for high ability workers in both information treatments (with less impact when
the last oﬀer of the employer was rejected in the information treatment with expected
25 periods). For the information treatment with fixed periods, this result contradicts
the theoretical prediction of a neutral eﬀect of the ability on the employers’ behavior.
Men oﬀer less training than women in the inform fixed periods treatment. Risk-seeking
participants show a higher probability of oﬀering training.
11This variable was obtained in the following manner: when the participants are asked to pick a
computer number, they are privately invited to choose a show up fee of $5 or a chance to earn $11 with
a 50% probability or $0 with a 50% probability. For those choosing the lottery, a coin toss decides their
earnings at the end of the experiment. It seems reasonable to suggest that the participants who choose
the lottery are more risk-seekers than those choosing the guaranteed $5. However, we recognize that
this measure of risk attitude is largely imprecise considering that attitude toward risk is contextual.
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Table 4: Determinants of employers oﬀering a training
(Random eﬀects probit model)
Variables and
incidental param.
Non Inform Inform Inform
25 Periods known Expected 25 periods
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1st period 0.2085 0.2096 0.0502 0.1072 -0.9183a -0.9089a
(0.4268) (0.4919) (0.6204) (0.5301) (0.2890) (0.3256)
Last 5 periods 0.0806 0.0794 -0.0421 -0.0498
(0.2551) (0.3218) (0.3969) (0.3916)
Period -0.0536a -0.0562a -0.0484b -0.0486b -0.0286a -0.0286a
(0.0110) (0.0137) (0.0209) (0.0227) (0.0073) (0.0089)
Ability -0.3677 -0.4809 0.8552b 1.1270c 0.1020 0.8689c
(0.5268) (0.6930) (0.3767) (0.6322) (0.4700) (0.4712)
Last oﬀer rejected 0.4023c 0.3384 0.0898 0.0660 0.0936 0.0935
(0.2219) (0.3193) (0.1935) (0.1934) (0.1841) (0.2309)
Last oﬀer rejected x Ability -0.2037 -0.0770 -0.7198 -0.5905 -0.7358a -0.7096b
(0.3272) (0.4209) (0.5135) (0.7992) (0.2793) (0.3311)
Male -0.0669 -1.4289b 0.4949
(0.5978) (0.5731) (0.5406)
Graduate student 1.0452 0.7009 0.0239
(0.9194) (1.1050) (0.4745)
Econ. or related field student -0.6167 0.5356 0.4671
(0.7724) (0.6163) (0.4739)
Previous participant 0.7361 0.8089 -0.0334
(0.7726) (0.6247) (0.5569)
Risk lover 0.7481 2.0600a -0.5330
(0.6495) (0.7448) (0.7039)
Constant 2.5425a 2.4670b 2.5775a 1.0425 2.1583a 1.5274
(0.4551) (1.1222) (0.4815) (0.9960) (0.3576) (0.9924)
ρ 0.5944a 0.6801a 0.7192a 0.6630a 0.5866a 0.5301a
(0.0894) (0.1162) (0.0735) (0.1243) (0.0875) (0.1348)
Log Likelihood:
Constraint value -375.19 -375.19 -408.71 -408.71 -382.17 -382.17
Binary Probit value -347.12 -322.97 -365.78 -317.76 -365.31 -354.48
Random eﬀects Probit value -258.66 -253.48 -245.94 -239.73 -302.60 -301.64
Number of observations 900 900 900 900 900 900
Note: Number of observations: 900 for all specifications. a: statistically significant at 1%; b:
statistically significant at 5%; c: statistically significant at 10%.
4.3. Reputation issue and how workers react to training oﬀers
The light column of figure 2 indicates that with the introduction of information with
a fixed number of periods, more training is oﬀered to high ability workers relative to
low ability workers, which contradicts our theoretical predictions. It appears in that
employers are particularly concerned with their reputation with high ability workers.
In every information treatment, the worker knows about the reputation of the employer
to which he is currently matched. Specifically, the worker knows if his current employer
has honored his last promise or not. In the aﬃrmative case, the employer is developing
a good reputation, Pobs > 0, and otherwise a bad reputation, Pobs = 0. There are
cases where the employer has no reputation, Pobs = none, because he never oﬀered
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training or the oﬀers were never accepted by the worker. This is also the situation
that prevails for the first period of the game.12 On the one hand, it may be less
risky for employers with a good reputation (Pobs > 0) to have their costly training
oﬀer be rejected. Thus, compared to employers with a bad reputation (Pobs = 0), a
higher proportion of employers with a good reputation should oﬀer training to workers
regardless of their ability level. This behavior is observed in figures 3a and 3b, which
reports the proportion of training oﬀers conditioned on the reputation of employers.
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Training oﬀers by ability level and reputation
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Figure 4b: Expected 25 periods
Distribution of employers’ reputation status by ability level of workers
On the other hand, the rent produced with the training of a high ability worker is higher
than the rent obtained with a low ability worker. Therefore, the employers confronted
to high ability workers have a strong incentive to make a training oﬀer and to build a
good reputation. In other words, they are more likely to make an oﬀer in the subsequent
games.
This virtuous dynamics is observed in figures 4a and 4b, which report the distribution
of the employes’ reputation status by the ability level of workers. In the information
treatment with a fixed number of periods, we observe a larger proportion of employers
with a good reputation in the high ability workers category relative to low ability workers
12 In all figures dealing with employers’ reputation, we excluded the first period decisions.
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(U-test statistically significant). A substantial diﬀerence is also observed in a reversed
way for the employers with a bad reputation status. A similar pattern is found in the
information treatment with expected 25 periods: high ability workers attract employers
with a good reputation and low ability workers have a larger share of bad reputation
employers (U-test statistically significant).
As seen in Figure 2, the proportion of workers accepting the training oﬀer vary by
treatments. Low ability workers knowing that the rent generated by their training is
relatively low might anticipate that employers will not honor their promise irrespective
of the information situation and therefore are more likely to refuse the training oﬀer. On
the opposite, high ability workers are more confident to receive what was promised to
them for training and are more likely to accept it. However, the information condition
appears to matter when the employer has a good reputation. This is illustrated with
figures 5a and 5b that show the proportion of low and high ability workers accepting
the training oﬀer controlled by the level of reputation of the employer. We can see
that a good reputation by the employer contributes to narrow the gap between low
and high ability level of the worker in accepting the training oﬀer (U-test statistically
insignificant in the ¨fixed¨ 25 periods treatment). A bad reputation substantially lowers
the acceptance level in general, but particularly for the low ability workers (U-test
statistically significant in the 25 periods).
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
high low
Ability level
P
ro
po
rti
on
s
Pobs=0 Pobs>0
Figure 5a: 25 periods
0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
high low
Ability level
P
ro
po
rti
on
s
Pobs=0 Pobs>0
Figure 5b: Expected 25 periods
Proportion of workers by abiliity level accepting the training oﬀer
by employer of diﬀerent levels of reputation
Other variables are likely to aﬀect the worker’s behavior. If the last promise was not
honored by the employer, this costly situation for the worker might aﬀect his decision
when the next oﬀer will appear. The value of the promise might also play a role in the
worker’s decision. In particular, we have noted that 3% of the employers’ oﬀers were
not credible: these are oﬀers where the employers would be better oﬀ oﬀering nothing
if the workers were to accept that kind of oﬀers. These oﬀers are clearly non credible
and we expect workers to reject them.
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In table 5, we analyze the determinants of the decision by a worker i at period t to
accept or reject an oﬀer by the employer. Since the worker’s decision is conditioned by
the employer oﬀering a training, we use a random eﬀects probit model with unbalanced
data for the estimations. In the no information treatments (NI), assuming workers
marginally trust the employers’ promise of in the first round, the probability of accepting
the oﬀers declines strongly over periods. Following a refusal by an employer to transfer
the amount promised, the probability to accept a new oﬀer is reduced. Thus, workers
are discouraged to cooperate over time by employers who refuse to pay their promises.
The erosion of trust can be explained by negative reciprocity: workers mislead by their
current employer are less likely to accept new oﬀers from future employers. The absence
of reward from one particular employer discredits all employers.
In both information treatments (I) and (IE), the high ability worker is more likely to
accept the training than a low ability worker, which contradicts our theoretical predic-
tions for the (I) treatment. An increase in the value of the amount promised increases
the probability to accept the oﬀer, but within certain limits as the probability to accept
an oﬀer is decreasing with a non credible promise. Thus, the size of the rent associ-
ated with training influences positively the probability of accepting training. In the
information treatments, the reputation of the current employer comes into play: a good
reputation does increase the probability that the worker will accept the oﬀer while a
bad reputation decreases this probability. In both treatments, the bad reputation sta-
tus exerts a stronger eﬀect. Thus, there is evidence of a reciprocity strategy played by
the workers. This reciprocity is relatively more important in the information treatment
with a fixed number of periods. For the information treatment with a random number
of periods, the reciprocity associated with the variable ’last acceptation not honored’
appears to matter as much as the reciprocity with the employer’s reputation status
contrary to the previous information treatment. This diﬀerence might be explained by
the risk factor associated with the random number of periods the game is played. Some
indication leading in that direction is that the probability of accepting the training oﬀer
decreases with the number of periods of play in that information treatment.
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Table 5: Determinants of workers accepting the training
(Random eﬀects probit model with unbalanced data)
Variables and
incidental param.
Non Inform Inform Inform
25 periods known Expected 25 periods
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
1st period 0.5524c 0.5527 0.3472 0.3306 0.2150 0.2078
(0.3132) (0.3531) (0.5039) (0.5462) (0.3107) (0.3557)
Last 5 periods 0.2354 0.2356 0.1954 0.2033
(0.2239) (0.2991) (0.2735) (0.3269)
Period -0.0535a -0.0535a -0.0054 -0.0061 -0.0208a -0.0207a
(0.0126) (0.0169) (0.0145) (0.0161) (0.0076) (0.0075)
Ability 0.4853 0.5658 0.7700a 0.8454a 0.7416a 0.8327b
(0.3320) (0.4221) (0.2475) (0.2833) (0.2672) (0.3296)
Last acceptation not honored -0.3702b -0.3703c -0.1341 -0.1262 -0.5446b -0.5378c
(0.1807) (0.1922) (0.2520) (0.2754) (0.2524) (0.2772)
Amount promised 0.2011 0.2192 2.7366a 2.7657a 1.5826a 1.5932a
(0.2516) (0.2746) (0.4194) (0.5080) (0.2932) (0.3253)
Non-credible promise -0.7882 -0.8075 -1.9633a -1.9619a -1.0346a -1.0338a
(0.4992) (0.5776) (0.4339) (0.4749) (0.2625) (0.3206)
Good reputation of A 0.8593b 0.8134c 0.6510a 0.6466a
(0.4057) (0.4599) (0.2104) (0.2208)
Bad reputation of A -0.9972a -1.0156b -0.5672b -0.5719b
(0.3856) (0.4330) (0.2295) (0.2446)
Male -0.2447 -0.0781 -0.0021
(0.5455) (0.3322) (0.4589)
Graduate student 0.1083 0.4108 -0.2931
(0.5385) (0.3502) (0.3525)
Econ. or related field -0.4868 0.1323 0.2606
(0.3724) (0.2876) (0.3989)
Previous participant 0.0932 0.2691 0.3480
(0.5549) (0.2391) (0.2731)
Risk lover 0.3285 0.2779 -0.1224
(0.4110) (0.2968) (0.4599)
Constant -0.1302 -0.0700 -1.5348a -1.9917a -0.9282a -1.0354b
(0.3200) (0.5902) (0.3902) (0.5813) (0.2992) (0.4615)
ρ 0.3770a 0.3677a 0.2159a 0.1813b 0.2898a 0.2610a
(0.0788) (0.1002) (0.0764) (0.0903) (0.0730) (0.0743)
Log Likelihood:
Constraint value -503.82 -503.82 -507.81 -507.81 -529.35 -529.35
Binary Probit value -467.63 -458.49 -343.17 -336.26 -437.50 -429.97
Random eﬀects probit value -411.67 -409.87 -328.97 -325.05 -402.35 -400.54
Number of observations 768 768 748 748 764 764
Note: statistically significant at 1%; b: statistically significant at 5%; c: statistically significant
at 10%.
18
Thus, our theoretical predictions concerning the workers’ behavior are relatively accu-
rate as the game evolved for the no information treatments. Without information about
reputation, there is little reason to suppose that cooperation can be sustained. Our pre-
dictions are also in line with the results for the information treatments with a random
number of periods of play. The employers’ reputation matters and more able workers are
more willing to accept the training oﬀers. However, they are refuted for the information
treatments with fixed number of periods where the ability level of the workers and the
reputation of the employers influence significantly the decision by workers to accept the
training oﬀer. These results can be explained by the fact that some participants assess
a positive probability that their partners are ’cooperative’ if the others cooperate, then
sequential equilibria exist where perfectly rational players cooperate in finitely repeated
game until the last few periods (Kreps, Roberts and Wilson, 1982). Unfortunately, we
do not observe any period eﬀects to validate this explanation.13
Interestingly, the random eﬀects probit models leave no room for the observed char-
acteristics by the participants to play a role in the decision to accept a training oﬀer.
Incentives and information variables associated with the experimental variables are the
key factors to explain the workers’ decision to accept the employer’s oﬀer. Note that
with matched employers-workers survey data, up to 30% of workers refuse training oﬀers
(See Turcotte, Leonard and Montmarquette, 2003).
4.4. Employers’ monetary incentives and reward of workers’ training.
Can the bilateral deviation from the equilibrium be explained (rationalized) by the
employers’ monetary incentives (in ECU) and reward behavior? From the worker’s
points of view, does it pay to cooperate?
An employer can influence the worker’s behavior in two ways. First, by attaching
the promise of a bonus to the worker’s acceptance of the training. In doing so, the
employer promises to reciprocate to the worker’s cooperative behavior (see Ferh and
Gachter, 1999, Falk and Gächter, 2002). If the worker accepts the training, he trusts
the employer’s reciprocity. Second, an employer may or may not honor his promise
at the end of the game. The reward behavior contributes, in the No Information
treatments, to reinforce trust in reciprocity and, in both Information treatments, to
build the employer’s reputation.
13Cooperation with a finite horizon model was also noted by Bolton et al (2005). They believe that
a theoretical model can support this result.
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Figure 6: Bonuses promised and paid to workers
In figure 6, we show that the value of the employers’ promises are higher than the
reward payments. The amounts promised and paid to depend on the ability level of the
worker: the higher the ability level, the higher the bonuses promised and paid (most
U-tests are statistically significant). These results were predicted only for the random
periods treatment. As expected, however, the diﬀerences between the values of the
bonuses promised and paid are lower with the information treatments than with the no
information treatments (t-tests statistically significant).
4.4.1. Employers’ reward and reputation building
At the end of a round, the employer oﬀering training chooses whether to honor his
promise. This decision does not have the same impact and interpretation in our treat-
ments. In the No Information treatments, the employer’s individual decision has no
direct influence on future games. But, if all of them refuse to pay, they discourage
workers over the next rounds to accept training through negative reciprocity. In the
information treatments, the employer developing a good or a bad reputation does not
have a neutral eﬀect on the worker’s acceptance decision for training as was shown in
table 4.
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Figure 7: Proportions of bonuses paid to workers by treatments.
Figure 7 shows that the proportion of bonuses paid to trained workers are high for
informed workers, reaching 87% for high ability workers in the information treatment
with a fixed number of periods. The proportion drops dramatically in the no information
treatment with less than one third of low ability trained workers rewarded and 55% or
the high ability workers (U-tests statistically significant for both AI and AIE with
respect to ANI and NANI). As seen before, both information treatments reduce the
gap between low and high ability trained workers in terms of employers honoring their
promises.
In table 6, we use a two-step procedure with unbalanced panel data, explaining first
the decision by the employers to respect or not to respect their promise with a random
probit model. In the second step, we use Feasible Generalized Least Squares to analyze
the determinants of the actual amount transferred to the trained workers corrected for
a selection bias with the Mill’s inverse ratio variable obtained from the first step.14
To compare the promises in the diﬀerent ability treatments, we have standardized them:
Pnh = P(101−46.2) for the high ability treatment and P
nl = P(35.5−2.5) for the low ability
treatment. Normalized oﬀers above one are not credible - accounting for 3.1% of the
total oﬀers - and were ignored in the regressions.15
The regression results confirmed the importance of information and therefore of the de-
velopment of a good reputation in the probability of an employer respecting his promises
as suggested with figures 5a and 5b. We would have expect, however, this reputation
seeking to be more important in the information with expected 25 periods treatments
14The two-step procedure is an alternative to a generalized tobit model, which is not obvious to
estimate in a panel setting. For the amount transferred, we use a two error components random eﬀects
model. New cross-variables are introduced to distinguish between the information with fixed 25 periods
and the non information treatments for ’Last 5 periods’, ’Last oﬀer’ and ’Ability’ variables. This two-
step procedure is less rectrictive than the tradional Tobit model. Unfortunalely, none of these techniques
are nested.
15Few observations are clustered at one. We have ignored this upper limit.
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than with the fixed 25 period treatments. When an employer has his last training oﬀer
rejected, he has a tendency not to respect his promise in an eﬀort somehow to recoup
his losses. However, this strategy is less important for the high ability workers in line
with the importance for the employers to maintain a good reputation with this category
of workers. We note that as the experiment evolves, the probability of an employer
honoring his promises declines with endgames eﬀect in the No Information and fixed
Information treatments. Finally, as for the case of the probability of a worker accepting
the training, we found that the observed covariate variables are insignificant when we
control for a random individual eﬀect.
Information significantly increases the amount transferred to the trained workers. The
worker’s ability strongly influences the amount transferred, in all treatments, but even
more so in the no informaion treatment and in the information treatment with a fixed
25 periods. In a sense the level of ability narrows the gap between the informaton and
the no information treatments in the value of the amounts transferred to the workers
when the employer has decided to honor his promise. Finally, the amounts transferred
increase with graduate students and with male participants.
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Table 6: Determinants of employers respecting his promise and amounts transferred to workers
(Random eﬀects probits and FGLS in panel with unbalanced data)
Variables and
incidental param.
Random
eﬀects probit
FGLS
Random
eﬀects probit
FGLS
Period -0.0279b -0.0306b
(0.0129) (0.0133)
Period x inform 25 0.0192 0.0212
(0.0175) (0.0176)
Inform (fixed) 1.6752a 0.1450 2.0278a 0.2021b
(0.5847) (0.0942) (0.7180) (0.0965)
Inform 25 1.2274c 0.2251b 0.9685 0.1688b
(0.6401) (0.0895) (0.8617) (0.0817)
Non Inform x last 5 periods -0.5153c 0.0091 -0.5325c 0.0483
(0.3046) (0.0625) (0.2981) (0.0543)
Inform x last 5 periods -0.4875 -0.0599b -0.4322 -0.0396c
(0.3381) (0.0247) (0.3511) (0.0212)
Ability 0.3995 0.1494b 0.9766 0.1827b
(0.5721) (0.0635) (0.6629) (0.0753)
Last oﬀer rejected x Ability 0.5192c 0.0264 0.5256 0.0043
(0.3143) (0.0397) (0.3226) (0.0357)
Ability x inform 0.6172 0.0323 0.1812 -0.0470
(0.7688) (0.0720) (0.9124) (0.0780)
Ability x inform 25 0.6863 -0.0732 -0.0619 -0.1448c
(0.8458) (0.0701) (0.9570) (0.0770)
Last oﬀer rejected -0.6399b -0.0303 -0.6397b 0.0010
(0.2724) (0.0510) (0.2776) (0.0450)
Last oﬀer rejected x Inform -0.5037 -0.0285 -0.4841 -0.0187
(0.3718) (0.0319) (0.3805) (0.0319)
Last oﬀer rejected x inform 25 -0.0690 0.0170 -0.0547 0.0088
(0.3529) (0.0324) (0.3752) (0.0318)
Male -0.4700 0.0497c
(0.3764) (0.0283)
Graduate student 0.7138 0.1377a
(0.4498) (0.0339)
Econ. or related field student -0.2530 -0.0430
(0.4033) (0.0281)
Previous participant -0.0769 0.0195
(0.3857) (0.0309)
Risk lover 0.2354 -0.0425
(0.4040) (0.0375)
Constant -0.3768 0.1540 -0.5375 0.1340
(0.4273) (0.1076) (0.6704) (0.1073)
ρ 0.6685a 0.7153a
(0.0562) (0.0545)
Mill’s Inverse Ratio 0.1619b 0.0999
(0.0766) (0.0626)
R-squared 0.0209 0.0919
Log Likelihood:
Constraint value -643.08 -643.08
Binary Probit value -537.78 -523.38
Random eﬀects probit value -412.08 -409.36
Number of observations 1108 812 1108 812
Note: 1108 observations for the probits and 812 for the FGLS regressions. a: statistically
significant at 1%; b: statistically significant at 5%; c: statistically significant at 10%.
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5. Conclusion
Do people succeed in cooperating and generating a training rent? As pointed out
by game theory, this strongly relies on the credibility at the end of the game of the
profit sharing rule. In the absence of external institutions, coordination on the optimal
outcome is diﬃcult to achieve. However, reputation building can be an eﬀective means
of enforcing cooperation if an institution tracks and disseminates information about
players’ past actions.
In the no information treatments, the decisions by the employers and the workers con-
verge over time with the theoretical predictions of no oﬀer and no acceptation of training.
As predicted, the ability level (i.e. the size of the rent), does not play a role. The em-
ployer and the worker enter into a negative reciprocity dynamics. Unrewarded trainings
reduce the worker’s probability to accept the training over time. As a consequence, the
employer decreases the amount promised. In that context there are major barriers to
training in firms.
In both information treatments, the probability of oﬀering a training decreases over
time. In the information treatments with a fixed number of periods, a higher ability
increases the probability of oﬀering a training, contradicting the theoretical predictions.
An oﬀer by an employer rejected in the previous period decreases the probability that
the employer will oﬀer a training to a high ability worker in the information treatment
with a random number of periods.
In both infomation treatments, the ability and the amount promised by the employers
increase the probability of workers accepting the training. Information allows reputation
building. An employer with a good reputation coupled with a credible oﬀer greatly
increases the probability that the worker will accept the training while a bad reputation
reduces that probability.
The development of a good reputation plays a strong role in the probability of an
employer respecting his promises. However, this reputation seeking is not as important
in the information treatment with a random number of periods. An employer whose last
training oﬀer was rejected tries to recoup his losses by not respecting his current promise.
This strategy is less important for the high ability workers in line with the importance
for the employers to maintain a good reputation with this category of workers. We note
that as the experiment proceeds, the probability of honoring his promise declines with
endgames eﬀect in the no information and in the fixed information treatments. Finally,
the ability narrows the gap between the informion and non information treatments in
the amounts transferred to the workers.
The introduction of an information system on the reward of the last trained worker
positively and significantly influences the behavior of the players. However, this mech-
anism presents some drawbacks. Not all the employers were able to establish a good
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reputation, which suggests that information does not provide enough incentives to dis-
cipline reward behaviors. Overall, while information and reputation matter for training
in firms, however, this is likely to be a long and costly process and might not be a good
substitute for a certification alternative.
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6. Appendix
6.1. Numerical application
Table A1: The distribution of the workers’ type.
Types Ability level % of workers h = 100× η
i
p0 very low 20% η0 = 46
p1 low 30% η1 = 80
p2 high 30% η2 = 126
p3 very high 20% η3 = 216
Table A2: The output yi= αeτηi with i=0,...,3
employer worker output Types
Training eﬀort p0 p1 p2 p3
τ = 1 e = 1 y1 69 120 189 324
τ = 1 e = 0 y2 46 80 126 216
τ = 0 y3 46 80 126 216
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6.2. Definition of variables used in the regressions
Table A3: Definition of variables
Endogenous Variables
Decision by A to oﬀer a training: 1 = yes; 0 = no
Amount promised by A: P or 0
Decision by B to accept the oﬀer 1 = yes; 0 = no
Decision by A to honor his promise 1 = yes; 0 = no
Amount transferred by A P or 0
Exogenous or Predetermined Variable
Variable associated with the experiment
Dummy by treatment: Non-Informed = 1; 0 otherwise
Informed with 25 periods = 1; 0 otherwise
Inform with expected 25 periods = 1; 0 otherwise
Low ability = 1; 0 otherwise
High ability = 1; 0 otherwise
1st period dummy = 1 if the first period; 0 otherwise
Last 5 periods dummies = 1 if the last five periods; 0 otherwise
Period 1 to 25
Last oﬀer by A was rejected: 1 = yes; 0 = no
Last oﬀer by A rejected*High ability = 1 if the last oﬀer by A was rejected
by high ability workers; 0 otherwise
Last acceptation by B was not honored by A: 1 = yes; 0 = no
Non credible oﬀer by A: crossed variable with P and a dummy
set to 1 if the oﬀer by A means A
loosing money; 0 otherwise
Reputation of A:
Bad reputation corresponds to the fact that 1 = yes; 0 = no
the last bonus promised by A equals 0:
Good reputation corresponds to the fact that 1 = yes; 0 = no
the last bonus promised by A is positive:
No reputation means that participant A has never 1 = yes; 0 = no
had the opportunity to honor or not his promise:
Characteristics of the participants
Sex: 1 = male; 0 = female
Graduate student: 1 = yes; 0 = otherwise
Economics or related field: 1 = yes; 0 = otherwise
Previous participant: 1 = the participant has participated
to other experiments; 0 = othiswise
Risk seeking attitude: = if the participant selected the
lottery instead of the fixed
show-up fee.
A:employer; B: worker.
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6.3. Instructions for the high ability and information with fixed 25 periods
treatment (AI)
You are taking part in an experiment where you are asked to make decisions. Over the
course of this experiment, you can win money. The amount of money depends on your
decisions, and in some cases, on another person’s decisions.
Each one of you takes his/her decisions individually in front of his/her computer. You
are asked not to communicate with other participants.
In the experiment, anonymous pairs will be formed from a participant A and a par-
ticipant B. The experiment will be comprised of 25 independent periods. Each each
new period, the pairs will be randomly formed with a participant A and a participant
B. You are designated as a participant A or a participant B at the beginning of the
experiment. You will keep this role for the entire duration of the experimental session.
Unfolding of a period:
Each period consists of three steps.
During the first step, participant A decides whether or not to oﬀer a premium P to
participant B. P must take the form of an integer and a decimal. The allowed values
of P are, for example: (0.1; 0.2; ...; 13.7; 13.8; ...).
⇒ If A does not oﬀer a premium, the period ends and the participants’ earnings are
46.2 experimental units (EU) for A and 23.5 EU for B.
In the second step, if A has oﬀered a premium P , B is informed of the amount of the
promised premium and must then decide to accept or to decline the proposition from
A.
⇒ If B refuses, B will earn 23.5 EU and A will gain 41.2 EU. The period is now over.
⇒ If B accepts, B will earn 13.5 EU plus the premium P , that is (13.5 + P ). A will
earn the amount corresponding to 101.0 minus the premium P , that is (101.0-P ).
In the third step, A decides to pay or not to pay the promised premium. If the decision
is positive, the value of the promised premium is P . If A does not pay the premium,
the value of P is 0.
Observation of the last premium paid by participant A:
At the beginning of each period except for the first period, the participant B takes note
of the last premium paid by the participant A. The participant B receives the following
message on his computer screen:
→ “The last premium paid by this participant A was of” followed by the amount of the
last premium paid by A.
If this participant A has not paid the last promised premium, the following message is
shown on the screen:
→ “The last premium paid by this participant was 0”
Note that if A has never oﬀered a premium to a participant B, this information is
not available. B is informed that this participant A has never oﬀered a premium to a
participant B up to now. Participant B sees the following message on the computer
screen:
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→ “This participant A has not paid a premium to a participant B so far. Note that
either A has never promised a premium, or no participant B has accepted his or her
proposition.”
Information available at the end of each period:
At the end of each period, depending on the decisions taken, you are informed of:
- A’s decision (oﬀer a premium or not);
- The amount of the promised premium P;
- B’s decision (accept or decline the premium);
- The payment or the non-payment of the promised premium;
- Your earnings for this period;
- Your cumulative earnings.
Calculating your earnings:
Your total earnings from the experimental session are determined by the sum of the
earnings for each period. The value of your account will be converted in Canadian
dollars with a conversion rate of 2 cents per 1 EU.
Before we begin the experiment, we will ask you a few questions regarding the under-
standing of these instructions. To carry on, everybody must have correctly answered
all questions.
You will then be asked to please provide us with some information regarding your age,
gender, level and field of study, attended school or university and whether you have
already taken part in an experiment.
We encourage you to take a few minutes to go over the instructions. You will then be
asked to take place in front of your computer. If you have any questions, raise your
hand and we will come and see you.
During the experiment, please do not ask questions or raise your voice. Thank you for
respecting these rules.
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